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I
n her January 2017 speech on 
the UK’s negotiating objectives, 
Prime Minister May made express 
reference to financial services, 
suggesting that single market access 
arrangements for certain sectors, 
including financial services, could take 
in elements of current single market 
arrangements.  Why this focus on 
financial services given the array of 
industry and other sectors competing 
for attention? The answer lies in the 
interdependency between the UK 
financial services industry and that 
of the EU-27, and in the related and 
wider economic ramifications. The 
City of London is one of the world’s 
great centres for financial services. But 
some 30% of its wholesale market 
activities (or the professional services 
relating to, for example, trading, risk 
management, and asset management 
which power the financial markets and 
channel funding to the real economy) 
derives from EU business; in some 
areas of derivatives trading business, 
essential for risk management, the City 
hosts over 70% of EU trading activity. 
While speculation can be perilous, it 
is not unreasonable to suggest that 
adverse economic consequences will 
follow, at least in the short term, if the 
UK loses easy access to the EU market. 
The EU is similarly dependent on the 
UK. The City of London exports to the 
EU 27 some 35% of the wholesale 
financial market activities which take 
place in the EU and which power the 
real economy. While predictions must 
be made with caution, any significant 
disruption to this financial pipeline 
has at least the potential to disrupt 
the process through which funds are 
channelled from savers to the real 
economy, to damage the EU’s current 
efforts to strengthen capital-market-
based funding (and thereby to wean 
the EU from its current dependence 
on bank-based funding), and to 
weaken financial stability.
Passporting and the 
single market
Why should the negotiations between 
the EU and the UK address Brexit-
related disruption to financial services? 
The financial services sector is one of 
the most highly regulated sectors of the 
modern economy given the financial 
stability and investor protection risks it 
generates and the potential fiscal risks 
to taxpayers of any bailouts of financial 
actors.   Jur isdict ions accordingly 
control access to their markets, usually 
adopt ing a  ‘nat iona l  t reatment ’ 
approach under which cross-border 
actors become subject to the rules and 
supervision of the ‘host’ state in which 
they are seeking to provide services – 
even though these firms are already 
regulated and supervised in their ‘home’ 
jurisdiction.  By contrast, under current 
single market rules EU financial market 
actors benefit from the financial services 
‘passport’ which allows them to operate 
cross-border in the EU in host financial 
markets on the basis (more or less) of 
home regulation and supervision in the 
country in which they are registered 
– the UK for UK firms. A UK firm can 
therefore operate cross-border in a 
relatively frictionless manner, at least 
in relation to financial regulation. 
The EU passport is heavily based on 
single market technology: the host 
regulators of other EU Member States 
accept passporting actors and defer to 
home regulators because of the ‘single 
rulebook’ which applies to EU financial 
services – a dense thicket of EU rules 
which has become ever more granular 
since the financial crisis – and because 
of the related supervisory coordination 
and cooperation arrangements which 
t ie home and host EU regulators 
together and which include the three 
European Supervisory Authorities. 
Current indications suggest that the 
UK financial services sector will lose 
the passport when the UK leaves the 
EU (it is possible that some form of 
transitional arrangement which retains 
passporting for a time may be agreed, 
but the successful conclusion of such 
an agreement will require solutions 
to  complex  ques t ions  inc lud ing 
regarding the continuing application 
of the single rulebook and Court of 
Justice oversight). The Prime Minister 
has indicated that the UK is to leave 
the single market and there is little 
evidence that the EU is likely to agree 
to bespoke access arrangements based 
on single market passporting; al l 
indications suggest a commitment to 
distinguishing between ‘membership’ 
of the single market (passporting) and 
‘access.’
 
And here the risk of pipeline disruption 
arises. Unless a harmonized EU access 
regime applies, access to EU financial 
markets is governed by the different 
national laws of the EU 27, who may 
have distinct competitive interests in 
obstructing UK access. Access of this 
type is also limited to national markets 
only – it does not support passporting. 
There is, however, a harmonized access 
regime in place for certain financial 
sectors under the EU’s ‘equivalence’ 
rules for ‘third countries’ (such as the 
UK on Brexit). But, as noted below, 
these rules do not provide a legally 
stable platform from which the UK 
financial services sector can continue 
to provide financial services to the EU 
27, using current business models and 
operations. There are other alternatives 
and the market can be expected to find 
solutions. UK firms could, for example, 
establish EU-based subsidiaries through 
which passporting business could be 
carried out. Indications are already 
emerging of a competition between 
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financial centres in the EU for UK-
based business. But this strategy is not 
cost free. Subsidiaries are subject to 
local rules, including in relation to tax 
and labour law, and EU rules apply, 
including in relation to the potentially 
costly ring-fencing of capital within 
the subsidiary which may disrupt the 
operation of the financial group in 
question.
Equivalence as a 
solution?
For many firms, access is l ikely to 
depend on the avai labi l i ty  of  an 
equivalence regime. The equivalence 
rules are based on the notion that 
where a third country’s  f inancia l 
regulation arrangements are ‘equivalent’ 
to those of the EU, access (in different 
forms) to the EU financial market is 
permitted, without the third country 
actor being required to follow EU law. 
In addition, where a third country 
regime is equivalent, restrictions which 
might otherwise apply to an EU actor 
when contracting with a third country 
actor are lifted. The current equivalence 
rules were not designed with the 
management of the EU’s relationship 
with its largest financial market in 
mind. They have developed over time, 
have been shaped by a multitude 
of different political, market, and 
institutional interests, and form a messy 
patchwork. There are many structural 
weaknesses in the equivalence regime. 
It is piecemeal, covering only a patchy 
collection of financial services. It does 
not cover banking, is limited in the 
asset management area, and extends 
only to certain aspects of investment 
services; it does not map on to the full 
range of financial services currently 
funnelled through the EU/UK pipeline. It 
is powered by single market technology, 
meaning that UK firms would remain 
subject to EU law in key respects: the 
availability (or not) of an equivalence 
route is set out in EU legislation, which 
can be amended; the equivalence 
decision is made by the Commission, 
advised by the European Supervisory 
Authorities; and the Court of Justice of 
the EU retains oversight of the regime. 
It is unstable. The benchmarks which 
govern equivalence are high-level in 
nature and the Commission’s decision 
is discretionary and can be withdrawn. 
Even assuming the relevant equivalence 
decisions for those sectors for which 
equivalence is available were made in 
advance of the UK leaving the EU (the 
equivalence process assumes that the 
state in question is a ‘third country’ 
when the assessment is carried out) and 
‘cliff-edge’ effects avoided, the decision 
could be withdrawn, with related risks 
and costs, if UK financial regulation 
began, as is likely, to diverge from EU 
financial regulation and the high-level 
conditions on regulatory equivalence 
were deemed not to be met. A decision 
could also be withdrawn were an 
adverse determination subsequently 
made  a s  to  the  equ i va l ence  o f 
supervisory arrangements – a risk 
to which the UK could be exposed 
given the different approaches which 
regulators adopt to supervision. The 
equivalence process is technocratic, 
but  i t  i s  open  to  po l i t i c i za t ion , 
particularly as Commission decision-
making is overseen by a pol it ical 
committee composed of Member States 
representatives. These difficulties can be 
surmounted with goodwill, particularly 
as UK financial regulatory governance is 
currently heavily based on EU regulatory 
governance and as its supervisory 
arrangements have acted as an anchor 
for pan-EU financial services activity for 
many years. But the limited coverage 
of the equivalence regime remains a 
difficulty while overall the regime does 
not provide a stable underpinning for 
the EU/UK financial services pipeline.
A bespoke deal for 
financial services?
The Brexit negotiations are accordingly 
l i ke l y  to  inc lude  a  bespoke  EU/
UK market access arrangement for 
financial services, probably in a Free 
Trade Agreement. Politics aside, a 
series of design challenges arise, three 
of which are noted here. First, any 
arrangement will need to deal with 
regulatory dynamism, perhaps by 
linking EU/UK market access to the 
EU and the UK agreeing to ensure 
their regulatory regimes conform to a 
set of principles (rather than being in 
lock-step), including proportionality 
requirements. A number of related 
difficulties will need to be addressed, 
including in relation to the source of 
these principles -  whether the many 
international standards of international 
f inanc ia l  gove r nance  (a l though 
these international standards are not 
designed to support market access, 
being concerned with supporting 
international financial stability, and it 
is not clear what happens where the 
EU has ‘carved out’ from one of these 
standards, as it frequently does, and the 
UK has not) or a bespoke set of agreed 
principles. Second, a dispute resolution/
monitoring mechanism will be required 
to ensure that parties do not defect and 
to ensure that regulatory arrangements 
continue to conform to the relevant 
principles. Distinct conundrums arise 
here given the UK’s ‘red-line’ on the 
Court of Justice of the EU, although 
there are some models internationally 
which could be tweaked, including 
in relation to peer review. Finally, the 
supervision of cross-border actors, and 
related solutions governing fiscal risk-
sharing, need to be addressed. There 
are few international templates which 
allow market access based on home-
based supervision; usually, some form 
of national/host treatment applies. But 
EU supervision is still a predominantly 
nationally-located operation, save for 
within Banking Union, which makes the 
location of host/EU supervision difficult 
to pin down. There is a spectrum of 
potential outcomes, ranging from the 
highly controversial repatriation solution 
(requiring that certain businesses 
be located in the EU – this option is 
usually associated with the clearing 
of euro-denominated der ivat ives 
trades) through to relying on home/
UK supervision. Intermediate solutions 
could involve an empowerment of the 
European Supervisory Authorities to 
register and supervise UK actors – but 
distinct constitutional and political 
challenges, particularly in relation to the 
costs of supervision and firm failure, will 
need to be addressed.
Conclusion
It is in the EU’s and the UK’s interests 
t o  r e a c h  a n  a g re e m e n t .  B u t  a 
complex and intersecting array of 
political, institutional, and market 
preferences wil l  shape the Brexit 
negotiations. Member States, for 
example, can be expected to have 
different preferences depending on 
their distinct competitive interests 
which reflect the sti l l fragmented 
nature of the EU financial system. 
Institutionally, initial indications suggest 
that the Commission may not embrace 
radical new approaches outside the 
EU equivalence ‘acquis’, given its 
February 2017 Report on Equivalence 
which underlined that equivalence 
was not a tool for trade liberalization, 
suggested that the equivalence regime 
needed to look more closely at third 
country supervision, and signalled 
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that markets of greater systemic 
importance to the EU should receive 
a closer review.  On the other hand, 
geo-political conditions will matter. 
There are indications that the US 
is adopting a less accommodating 
posture to international financial 
governance and that global markets 
may be entering a phase in which 
domestic retrenchment replaces 
the coordination and convergence 
which has largely character ized 
global financial governance since 
the f inanc ia l  c r i s i s .  The EU/UK 
negotiations are unlikely to be blind 
to this development. Perhaps the 
safest prediction for the upcoming 
negotiations is that they will produce 
a workable transitional period over 
which the complexities of access can 
be addressed.
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